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I estimate the effects of changing an ascriptive characteristic on a market outcome while keeping the
average amount of information unchanged. Taking advantage of candidates' multiple appearances
in elections to office in a professional association and of the presence of different photographs
accompanying the ballots, I show that exogenous increases in beauty raise a candidate's chance of
success. The results support the inference that differential outcomes are inherent in agents' responses
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  An immense empirical literature in labor economics, spilling over into other sub-
fields and other disciplines, has produced estimates of differences in economic and other 
outcomes  by  race,  gender,  ethnicity,  religion,  sexual  orientation  and  other  ascriptive 
characteristics.    Most  of  these  studies  have  attempted  to  adjust  for  other  (call  them 
productivity-enhancing) characteristics that might affect the outcome of interest.  The 
pervasive  difficulty  is  that  there  may  well  be  unobservable  productivity-enhancing 
characteristics that are correlated with the  ascriptive characteristic of interest, biasing 
estimates of the impact of the latter. 
  One approach to circumventing this correlation is audit studies—sending probes 
(resumés, individual testers) to random samples of decision-makers to infer how they 
react to agents who may be otherwise identical except for the ascriptive characteristic.  
(See Fix and Struyk, 1995, on race; Neumark et al, 1996, on gender; Weichselbaumer, 
2003, on sexual orientation.)  Their hypothetical nature and the difficulties in inferring 
what their findings mean (Heckman, 1998) mean that they fail to solve this correlation 
problem in the context of actual decision-making.  Several studies (Blank, 1991; Goldin 
and  Rouse,  2000;  Straus  et  al,  2001)  deal  with  this  issue  in  real-world  behavior  by 
examining cases in which all the information on the ascriptive characteristic is removed.  
This solves one problem; but it is difficult to claim that the giant leap to no information 
about the characteristic will generate the same results as changing its distribution with no 
change in the average amount of information available to agents. 
No study has examined how actual decisions are altered when individual variation 
in the information changes with no change in the average amount of information.  We do   2 
that here in examining the effect of beauty, a characteristic that typically changes very 
slowly and one that affects outcomes in labor markets and elsewhere through a variety of 
mechanisms (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Mulford et 
al, 1998; Möbius and Rosenblat, 2005). 
II. Analytical Approach and Data 
  The  outcome  studied  is  election  as  an  officer  of  the  American  Economic 
Association.  Since 1935 the Association has conducted two annual four-person elections, 
for two slots as Vice-President and two as members of the Executive Committee.  In 
addition to the ballot each AEA member receives an information sheet containing short 
biographies and 1-1/4” x 1-1/2” snapshots of each candidate.  All of this information was 
available  beginning  with  elections  for  officers  for  1966  and  continuing  through  the 
elections for 2004, i.e., a total of 312 candidacies.  The 312 consist of only 216 different 
individuals,  including  147  who  appear  once,  57  who  appear  twice,  13  who  were 
nominated three times and 3 who appear four times.  Multiple candidacies are crucial to 
the analysis.  Because in most cases a candidate submitted a different picture each time 
s/he appeared on the ballot, the same candidate presented the voters with a different 
image in each candidacy.  Even though the same person is on the ballot, the information 
provided to voters by the candidates’ appearance may vary for this reason.  Moreover, 
because  his/her  competition  changes,  even  with  the  same  picture  a  candidate’s 
appearance relative to competitors can change.   3 
  The goal is to analyze whether a candidate’s appearance affects his/her electoral 
chances and how an individual’s changed appearance affects his/her chance of victory.
1  
We  cannot  determine  whether  voters  react  to  the  person’s  appearance  as  a  signal  of 
productivity, or whether voters have  a preference for  good looks independent of any 
signal.  With over 4000 economists voting in each of the elections, however, it is unlikely 
that more than a small minority knows the candidates personally. Professional reputation, 
including that conveyed in the written material accompanying the ballot, may matter, as 
may the information contained in the photograph. By examining multiple candidacies we 
can, however, infer whether changing one’s appearance affects how decision-makers (the 
voters) react to changes in the ascriptive characteristic beauty, holding constant other 
changes between ballots.
2 
  As shown in Donald and Hamermesh (2005), the probability of victory in these 
elections is significantly positively affected by a candidate’s scholarly impact (citations 
in journal articles, computed from the Social Science Citation Index)—his/her share of 
the citations received by the four candidates in the election; by being a woman, and by 
previously or currently holding a high-level government position.  In addition to these 
measures we also include other variables in describing the outcome: Affiliation (Top 5 
School,  or  nonacademic);  race  (African-American);  field  (theorist/econometrician); 
future Nobel Prize winner; and years since receiving the highest degree (essentially a 
proxy for age).  
                                                 
1To my knowledge Klein and Rosar (2005) is the only study even to consider one-time appearances of 
candidates in actual elections (rather than in hypothetical examples). 
 
2Mythical anecdotal evidence that this is the case is provided by Eddie Murphy’s “White Like Eddie” 
Saturday Night Live routine in the early 1980s. 
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  To examine the role of beauty in these elections we had the 312 photographs rated 
independently by each of four observers.  We needed to make sure that the raters did not 
know any of the candidates, but that they were familiar with whatever gestalt academic 
economists may typically present.
3  To deal with this difficulty I employed four entering 
first-year economics Ph.D. students, all of whom had attended undergraduate institutions 
in the United States, as raters.  To reflect the membership of the Association, three were 
male and one female.  Each was asked to rate the attractiveness of the candidate in each 
picture on a scale from 10 (top) to 1 (bottom) and to try to maintain an average rating of 5 
(without re-examining previously rated photos).  I assume that the raters’ perceptions 
represent the perceptions of the voters who confronted the photographs and the ballots. 
  Table 1 presents statistics describing the ratings.  There are substantial differences 
among raters in the moments of the distribution of ratings.  Accordingly, each rater i’s 
scores were normalized to yield standardized scores, the minima and maxima of which 
are shown in the final two columns of the first four rows.  The six pairwise correlations of 
these  scores  range  from  0.28  to  0.40,  with  Cronbach’s  alpha  equaling  0.65.    These 
statistics  indicate  a  very  slightly  lower  concordance  among  the  raters  than  has  been 
observed  in  other  studies  (e.g.,  Pfann  et  al,  2000),  possibly  because  the  photographs 
provided are very tiny, inducing more noise than usual.  Nonetheless, there is substantial 
agreement among raters:  All the pairwise correlation coefficients are highly significant 
statistically. 
  The four standardized ratings were averaged to obtain an average standardized 
rating, Rij, for each candidate i in election j.  A candidate’s beauty relative to the entire 
                                                 
3Several economists argued that this study would be impossible to conduct, since the beauty measure would 
be identically zero.   5 
history of candidates is unlikely to be relevant for his/her electoral chances.  Rather, and 
analogous to our treatment of citations, it is his/her relative beauty in the election that 
may affect the outcome.  Accordingly, for each candidacy we form: 
(1)  R
*
ij  =  Rij – R.j , 
where R.j is the average of the average standardized beauty of all four candidates in the 
j’th election.  We focus on the impact of R
*
ij   on the probability of election. 
III. Effects of Beauty in Elections, All Candidacies 1966-2004 
  The fraction of winners among the half of the 312 candidacies with above-average 
beauty is 0.548 (standard error of mean = 0.040); among the half of the candidacies with 
below-average  beauty  the  winning  fraction  is  only  0.452  (standard  error  of  mean  = 
0.040).  This simple cut of the data by whether the candidate’s beauty is above or below 
the average for his/her competitors suggests that beauty does matter in these elections.  
To examine this further, and as a baseline for comparing the results estimated over the 
multiple  candidacies,  Table  2  presents  estimates  of  the  impact  of  relative  average 
standardized beauty on a candidate’s chance of victory.  Because there are two winners, 
standard probit/logit estimation methods cannot be used.  While a conditional logit that 
used the six (4C2) possible pairs of candidates in an election as observations would solve 
the problem of two winners, the set-up violates the assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant  alternatives  in  the  conditional  logit  (the  absence  of  correlation  of  the 
unobservables across pairs).  To deal with this difficulty the coefficients presented in 
Table 2 are based on the multinomial multiple response estimator developed in Donald 
and Hamermesh (2005).  We assume that the errors follow the extreme value distribution,   6 
so  that  the  index  indicating  a  candidate’s  strength  is  estimated  under  assumptions 
analogous to those underlying ordinary logit estimation.
4 
  The first column in Table 2 shows estimates of the basic equation determining the 
probability of election.  Only the parameter estimates on citation share and female are 
presented:  The estimated coefficients on most of the other variables—being in a Top 5 
economics  department,  not  being  an  academic,  being  a  future  Nobelist,  a  theorist  or 
econometrician,  an  African-American,  and  years  of  post-degree  experience—had  no 
statistically or economically significant impacts. Having held a high-level government 
position  has  a  statistically  significant  positive  effect  but  is  not  of  interest  here.    The 
second column adds R
*
ij  to the equation.  In this cross section the impact of beauty on the 
probability of being elected is positive with a t-statistic greater than one, although not 
statistically  significant  at  conventional  levels.  The  estimated  effect  of  being  better 
looking than the other candidates is not small:  At one standard deviation below the mean 
beauty in an election an identical candidate has a chance of 0.44 of being elected; at one 
standard deviation above the mean the chance is 0.56. 
  Column (3) includes an interaction between R
*
ij and gender, based on previous 
work  (Hamermesh  and  Biddle,  1994)  that  indicated  that  the  impacts  of  beauty  on 
outcomes are greater for males.  The implications of the results are remarkable:  In this 
sample a woman’s looks relative to those of the other candidates in an election have 
absolutely  no  effect  on  her  electoral  chances.    Among  men,  however,  the  impact  is 
substantial and approaches statistical significance. Given the overriding importance of 
                                                 
4Coefficients using standard logit techniques are very similar to the correct ones displayed in Table 2.  
   7 
gender  in  these  elections  (74  percent  of  female  candidates  are  elected),  it  is  perhaps 
unsurprising that female candidates’ beauty has little marginal effect.
5 
  Columns (4) and (5) explore asymmetries in voters’ responses to the candidates’ 
relative beauty.  The estimates in column (4) demonstrate that moving further below the 
average looks in an election has no impact on one’s chances of winning; but it does pay 
to  be  increasingly  better  looking  than  one’s  competitors,  and  the  effect  is  large  and 
statistically  significant.    Moreover,  as  implied  by  the  estimates  in  Column  (5),  the 
asymmetry only matters for male candidates.  Being below or above average in looks has 
no impact on female candidates’ victory probabilities. 
IV. Using Multiple Candidacies to Infer the Effects of Beauty 
  The cross-section results in Section III suggest that even economists pay attention 
to  beauty  when  making  decisions.    For  whatever  reason  this  ascriptive  characteristic 
matters in determining an outcome that we assume is the result of maximizing choices 
made by a set of presumably rational agents.  The question is whether changes in the 
characteristic, holding constant other changes that might affect a candidate’s electoral 
chances, alter the outcomes.  To examine this possibility we estimate models over the 73 
candidates (165 candidacies) who appear in two or more elections. 
Variations in their perceived beauty are almost surely exogenous to the election 
outcomes:  It is extremely difficult to argue that the candidates learn about the role of 
beauty  from  their  prior  electoral  experiences  and  submit  more  appealing  pictures  on 
subsequent ballot appearances.  Indeed, in their first electoral outing Rij (R
*
ij) averaged 
0.026  (0.003);  in  their  final  electoral  outing,  the  second  for  most  of  the  73  sample 
                                                 
5In a reduced sample that excludes the 46 female candidacies the estimated impact of beauty among male 
candidates is larger than the estimates in Column (1) and is significant statistically.      8 
members, Rij (R
*
ij) averaged -0.083 (-0.010).  The differences in average beauty between 
a candidate’s first and final outings are statistically zero; but they do decrease, contrary to 
what one would expect if the candidates submitted pictures based on their learning about 
the role of beauty in the electoral process. 
  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 list estimates of the same equations as in Columns 
(2) and (4) of Table 2.  (With the elimination of nearly half the sample and thus no 
adding-up  constraint  on  predicted  probabilities,  ordinary  logit  estimation  becomes 
appropriate.)    The  standard  errors  are  robust,  accounting  for  the  clustering  of 
observations.  The parameter estimates and their implications are very similar to those 
estimated over the entire sample.   The  effect of R
*
ij is about the same (although the 
statistical significance is lower). Again we observe an asymmetric impact of R
*
ij, with a 
statistically significant advantage to being increasingly better looking than the average 
candidate, but no disadvantage to being increasingly worse looking. 
  In Column (3) the same specification as in Column (1) is re-estimated over the 
reduced sample of 33 people who win at least one election and lose at least one.  This 
sample is quite small, only 82 candidacies, so that sample size limitations lead us to 
expect a reduction in statistical significance compared to the earlier estimates.  Despite 
that, the t-statistic exceeds one in absolute value; and the point estimate of the marginal 
impact of an increase in beauty in this sub-sample is larger than in the entire sample or in 
the sample of all multiple candidacies. 
  For comparison to other estimates, Column (4) presents logit estimates over this 
same  sub-sample  of  candidacies,  including  only  those  variables  that  change  between 
candidacies—citation  share,  relative  average  standardized  beauty  and  years  of  post-  9 
degree experience.
6  Again there is fairly little change in the estimated impact of beauty 
on electoral outcomes compared to the other specifications and (larger) samples.  The 
parameter estimate is positive, and the t-statistic still exceeds one.  
  The conditional fixed-effect logit estimates are based on variations within the 33 
candidates who appear in 82 elections and who lost at least one election and won at least 
one.    The  average  duration  between  appearances  on  the  ballot  is  7.2  years,  with  a 
minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 21 years.  In many cases these durations may be 
sufficient  to  allow  the  candidate’s  underlying  beauty  to  change  slightly.
7    More 
important, however, with different photographs on the ballots voters’ perceptions of the 
candidates’ looks, as proxied by the raters’ perceptions, will vary across a candidate’s 
appearances.  The within-candidate variance of relative average standardized beauty is 39 
percent of the total variance in this measure. 
The estimates in the final column of Table 3 show the impacts of changes in 
candidates’ citations and beauty relative to the other three candidates  included in the 
elections in which they appear.  All of the variation is within the candidate (relative to the 
changing variation among the competing candidates).  Even with this stringent test we 
find roughly the same  effect of changes in the  candidate’s  relative beauty on his/her 
chances of winning an election as we have seen in the other estimates.  Moreover, the 
standard error of the parameter estimate remains roughly what it was (conditional on the 
                                                 
6This last changes differentially across observations because of differences in the time intervals between 
candidates’ appearances on the ballot.  
 
7There is evidence, however, of extremely high autocorrelation in an individual’s looks, even over many 
decades (Hatfield and Sprecher, 1986, pp. 282-283). 
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diminution of the sample size).
8  The mean probability of election in this reduced sub-
sample is 0.49.  When R
*
ij drops by one standard deviation, the electoral probability falls 
to 0.43; when it increases by one standard deviation, it rises to 0.55.  These effects are not 
small  and  are  nearly  identical  to  those  in  the  cross-section  estimates  over  the  entire 
sample.
9 
V.  Conclusions and Implications  
  This study has not shown that there is discrimination against bad-looking people 
or reverse discrimination in favor of the good looking.  Rather, I have demonstrated that a 
particular  real-world  outcome  becomes  more  favorable  for  the  same  person  when 
perceptions  of  his/her  looks  improve  exogenously.    When  sample  sizes  are  reduced 
sufficiently, the estimated impacts of beauty are no longer significant statistically; but the 
estimated impacts of perceptions of beauty remain unchanged, and the uncertainty about 
the  estimates  increases  solely  in  proportion  to  the  decrease  in  sample  sizes.    These 
findings  should  strengthen  the  conclusion,  both  about  beauty  and  by  inference  about 
other ascriptive characteristics such as race or gender, that even with the same average 
amount of information it is relative position that is important. The characteristic itself, not 
any correlation with unobservable productivity-enhancing characteristics, generates the 
apparent impacts on outcomes of interest. 
                                                 
8The  substantial  increase  in  the  estimated  effect  of  scholarly  productivity—the  share  of  citations—is 
surprising.  It does not stem from non-linearity in the impact of citations:  In the cross-section estimates in 
Table 2 a nonlinear term in this measure is insignificantly different from zero. It may arise from the fact 
that within-candidate variation in the citation share is only 15 percent of the total variance. 
  
9Re-estimating all the models in Table 3 by substituting Rij for R
*
ij does not alter the conclusions about the 
importance of beauty.  Indeed, the statistical significance of coefficients on Rij is greater than that of the 
estimates in Table 3 in all specifications. This similarity is not surprising, as the within-candidate standard 
deviation of average standardized beauty accounts for 33 percent of the total variation in this measure.  
Clearly, the variation in this measure in this equation stems from changes in perceptions of the individual 
candidate, not from changes in how the looks of his/her changing group of competitors are perceived.   11 
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Economics, 10 (Dec. 2003): 629-642. Table 1.  Beauty Evaluations, Individual and Composite (312 AEA Candidacies) 
 
                Average     Std. Dev.        Standardized: 
                     Minimum     Maximum 
  Individual Ratings: 
 
Male 1       5.43          1.21  -2.84    2.96 
 
Male 2       5.20          1.89  -2.23    2.02 
 
Male 3       4.71          1.20  -3.10    3.58 
 
Female       5.95           1.34  -2.19    2.27 
 
Average Standardized  
  Rating (Rij):         0           0.71  -1.80    2.71 
 
Relative Average Standardized  
  Rating (R
*
ij):        0           0.58  -1.73    2.00 Table 2.  Multinomial Multiple Response Estimates of the Impacts of Several 
Independent Variables on the Probability of Election, Elections 1966-2004, (N = 
312)* 
 
Ind. Var.:      (1)      (2)           (3)  (4)     (5)   
 
Citation Share   3.43    3.37          3.42       3.50          3.66 
                (0.79)    (0.81)        (0.78)     (0.82)      (0.85) 
 
Female     1.59    1.52           1.57       1.49          1.97 
                (0.34)    (0.35)        (0.34)    (0.35)       (0.56) 
 
Rel. Ave. Stdzd.              0.221         0.322       
 Beauty        (0.186)      (0.212) 
 
Rel. Ave. Stdzd.                  0.936        1.330 
 Beauty > 0                   (0.429)     (0.525) 
 
Rel. Ave. Stdzd.                          -0.399     -0.477 
 Beauty <0                            (0.378)     (0.414) 
 
Female*Rel. Ave.                             -0.428            
 Stdzd. Beauty                             (0.475) 
 
Female*Rel. Ave.                        -1.319 
 Stdzd. Beauty > 0                       (0.837) 
 
Female*Rel. Ave.                          0.351 
 Stdzd. Beauty <0                        (1.135) 
 
Log L              -112.81  -112.07     -111.67    -110.30  -109.00 
 
*Standard errors in parentheses here and in Table 3.   Also included in each equation are indicators of 
whether the candidate had held or currently holds a high-level government position, whether he/she was in 
a top-five economics department, whether he she was not an academic, would eventually win a Nobel 
Prize, was a theorist or econometrician, was an African-American, and a continuous measure of years since 
Ph.D. (or other terminal degree).   Table  3.    Logit  and  Conditional  Logit  Estimates  of  the  Determinants  of  the 
Probability of Election, Multiple Candidacies in Elections 1966-2004* 
 
           (1)            (2)  (3)      (4)         (5)  
 
                               Cond. FE 
Ind. Var.:        Logit with robust standard errors       logit 
 
Citation Share       5.24          5.35       3.67         2.55       13.63 
                    (1.48)      (1.53)    (1.79)      (1.15)      (5.17) 
 
Female         2.75          2.76       0.56         
                   (0.75)       (0.80)    (1.07)      
 
Rel. Ave. Stdzd.              0.353                  0.636    0.466      0.637 
 Beauty       (0.382)                  (0.542)   (0.415)   (0.598) 
 
Rel. Ave. Stdzd.            1.567     
 Beauty > 0             (0.689)     
 
Rel. Ave. Stdzd.           -0.508      
 Beauty <0             (0.549)      
 
Log L                  -97.82      -95.92     -50.68     -51.69      -20.26 
 
N (candidacies)          165          165    82       82          82 
 
N (candidates)           73            73    33       33          33 
 
*Also included in Columns (1) – (3) are indicators of whether the candidate had held or currently holds a 
high-level government position, where he/she was in a top-five economics department, whether he she was 
not an academic, would eventually win a Nobel Prize, was a theorist or econometrician, was an African-
American, and a continuous measure of years since Ph.D. (or other terminal degree).  The logit in column 
(4), and the conditional logit in column (5) include only the variables listed and the measure of years since 
degree. 
 